





















Syria is almost unique among Arab states in that the only variant of political Islam to be 
found here is state–sanctioned. This paper observes how the trends, tendencies and 
central figures of political Islam in Syria have positioned themselves with regard to 
relations with Europe, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and European 
Neighbourhood Policy.  Based on a series of (anonymous) interviews with both 
‘independent’ and more government-linked sources, Salam Kawakibi traces the 
evolution of political Islam in Syria, the growth of civil society agitation and the revival 
of practices of faith in this country. No party, no organisation and no individual within 
the country can claim to be both a representative of political Islam and independent, 
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POLITICAL ISLAM IN SYRIA 
SALAM KAWAKIBI* 
his paper observes how the trends, tendencies and central figures of political Islam in 
Syria have positioned themselves with regard to relations with Europe, the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership and European Neighbourhood Policy. Interviews were 
conducted with a range of individuals representative of different currents of thought, including 
both independent and more government-linked figures. The majority of those interviewed live 
in Syria and preferred to remain anonymous. However, certain quotations come from political 
texts published abroad. Compared to some other countries studied in this volume, a 
complicating factor with Syria is that the only variant of political Islam to be found within this 
country is the one sanctioned by political authorities. The only comparable case in the Arab 
world is that of Tunisia. No party, no organisation and no individual within the country can 
claim to be both a representative of political Islam and independent.  
The evolution of Syrian political Islam 
When Bachar al-Assad became Head of State on 17 July 2000, reformers’ hopes were high. The 
President’s own team put forward a policy of development and modernisation which, at first, 
sought to introduce simple economic liberalisation following the Chinese model of reform. This 
was a failure, however, and in a second stage the same team turned to administrative reform, 
drawing on the expertise of the French Ecole Nationale d’Administration and of the Conseil de 
l’Etat. A committee of technocrats and economists close to power proposed a programme of 
economic reform. Though the programme recognised the close links between the different fields 
which were to be reformed – economic, administrative and political – it prioritised the economic 
aspects, emphasising that political reform could always follow later.  
The summer of 2000 saw the beginning of the so-called ‘Damascus Spring’. Reformers issued a 
declaration demanding greater freedoms of association. The state-controlled media was quick to 
criticise these demands for reform, accusing activists of ‘spying’ on behalf of Western 
ambassadors. Debating forums were established in Damascus and other large towns. A new 
declaration was published, signed this time by 99 intellectuals, demanding the release of all 
political prisoners, freedom of speech and an end to the state of emergency.  
More than 600 political prisoners were released on 17 October 2000. New private press 
publications appeared. Similarly, the authorities allowed parties participating in the Front 
National Progressiste to publish and distribute their own newspapers. At the same time, the 
Association Syrienne des Droits de l’Homme was founded and the Comités de Défense des 
Droits de l’Homme were re-established. Though their activities remained under heavy 
surveillance, they were not prohibited. 
The opponents of reform felt threatened by the agitation of civil society and the resonance of its 
actions and positions within the wider public. They were especially scared by the sympathy 
which the young President and his close associates seemed to have for the legitimate demands 
of civil society. From February 2001 onwards, this led to a series of meetings in large towns, 
organised by the regional Baath party committees. Opposing them was a heterogeneous group 
of conservatives, including the military and security autocracy, and a business class which owed 
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its creation to economic and political emergency measures backed by institutional corruption. 
The retaliation of the authorities was brutal. The ‘Damascus Spring’ found its days shortened 
and its ambitions in tatters, with the detention of activists beginning in March 2001. However, 
the activists of the emerging civil society did not disarm. Despite the obstacles, they stuck to 
their cause, backed by their ever growing credibility.  
Against this political background, Syria was also caught up in the general trend witnessed 
across the Middle East of a rise in religious practice and ‘re-Islamisation’ of both private and 
public space. The Islamist question and its political implications for Syria have become 
especially prominent since the fall of Baghdad, and the suspected participation of Syrian 
‘mujahideens’ in the urban violence engulfing Iraq.  
Syrian conservatism has its roots in the traditions both of the country and of the region as a 
whole. However, ever since the modern state was created and with it a socio-political system 
drawing on diverse Western ideologies, Syria has moved towards secular reform with 
interpretations that were able to influence a particularly religious society. Consequently, one 
saw in the political sphere both the creation of secular parties and the development of a 
‘purified’ spirituality-independent of this political sphere. The political and cultural changes of 
the 1940s and 1950s took place outside though they never sought to undermine religion itself.  
These developments allowed for the creation of a national platform which brought together 
secularists and conservatives. Despite the authoritarian nature of the political system, 
progressive and liberal ideologies had a profound influence on society during the 1960s and 
1970s. The development of all kinds of literary and artistic production during this period, free 
from almost any religious censorship, was not coincidental. At this time political Islam in Syria 
was incarnated in the Muslim Brotherhood  which, in the 1950s, sat in the country’s 
democratically elected parliament – a rare occurrence in the history of modern day Syria. 
However violent clashes ended this ‘cohabitation’ and the Muslim Brotherhood became the 
sworn enemy of the political authorities. The violent confrontations between them and the 
authorities reached their climax with a law making mere membership of the group an offence 
punishable by death. As a result the authorities won this particular trial of strength at great cost, 
and those sympathetic to political Islam scattered themselves into exile in the West or in other 
Arab countries.  
However, when it later became apparent that both Marxist and Arab Nationalist ideologies had 
failed, the ‘palace strategists’ sought to re-appropriate religion and manipulate it to its own 
ends. This plan did not take into account the failed and bloody efforts of other authoritarian 
regimes that sought to manipulate Islam as a bulwark against a ‘red revolution’, as in the case of 
Anwar Sadat in Egypt. The Syrian authorities began to introduce religious vocabulary into 
political discourse and socio-cultural activities. The state’s implication in this religious 
resurgence was helped by ‘reformed’ former Muslim Brothers. The building of places of 
worship peaked in the 1980s and 1990s with the creation of well-controlled religious training 
schools. The aim was to achieve a monopoly of influence over a population which was 
becoming increasingly conservative.  
Secularism began to take a back seat with the re-Islamisation of society and culture, as indicated 
by the high percentage of women wearing the veil, the dissemination of religious texts which 
increasingly filled library shelves, the Islamisation of higher education, especially in the human 
sciences, and the reframing of all scientific, social and cultural phenomenon almost 
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Notwithstanding these trends, intellectuals such as Burhan Ghalioun
1 do not believe that 
Islamists would dominate the political system if democratic reform were forthcoming. Such a 
scenario is only likely “if Islamic-Arabic public opinion were by nature violent”, which he 
rejects. This might happen as a result only of a specific conjunction of social, economic and 
political conditions. Michel Kilo
2 agrees with this analysis and remarks that, with the exception 
of a small minority, Syrian Muslims do not favour violence and would be able to participate in a 
future democracy. 
However, one still observes a strong revival of assertive practices of faith. Syria has experienced 
a somewhat violent escalation of religious expression in both the cultural and social spheres. 
This had led Syrian Christians to fear for their rights, long protected by an enforced secularism 
and strong central power. Nor does the current Iraqi experience help the situation, taking place 
so close to Syria. The state, despite its symbolic strength and theoretical monopoly over the 
tools to influence public opinion, is for some the big absentee. In practice new religious 
authorities have begun to wield the most influence over public opinion.  
The evidence suggests that the regime is looking for legitimacy in letting these developments 
evolve. The danger would be if the authorities lost control of the phenomenon which they have 
been trying to harness. Priests are under surveillance, but small mosques escape this. Some 
Islamic classes for women have become brainwashing sessions, notably pushing for the wearing 
of the veil. In a cafe in Aleppo, a leaflet was handed out saying, “Become Muslim and you will 
have peace.” Increasingly, restaurants advise at the entrance that “we do not sell alcoholic 
beverages.” During the Ramadan of 2004 a judge sentenced a Syrian man for smoking in front 
of his shop during the fast. That was a new development, since failure to respect the fast in 
public places had previously been universally tolerated. Artistic production has also been 
affected, and intellectuals increasingly witness state censorship authorities adopting and 
enforcing commands made by religious leaders.  
While Islamists’ rhetoric often cites human rights as being the casualty of a repressive system, 
they highlight only those aspects which help their cause. Their positions are in some respects 
hesitant, rejecting other rights, especially in the social and cultural domains. The defenders of 
human rights do not exclude the possibility that they themselves could become the victims of 
political Islam if the latter gained power. However, such a premonition does not stop them from 
still considering Islamic rights to be in all cases indistinguishable from the rights of other 
political tendencies.  
As for the Islamists, their rhetoric changes according to the circumstances. They consider 
themselves to be the most active on the issue of human rights. Haythal al-Maleh, President of 
the Syrian Organisation for Human Rights for many years, and a lawyer and former political 
prisoner, was associated with Islamic movements. He is considered by militants, activists and 
opponents to be a person of great humanity. However, that did not stop him, at a meeting in 
Berlin in 2003,
3 from stating that he considered the death sentence as prescribed in the Koran to 
be acceptable, that homosexuals are sick, and that Islam grants women the all rights that they 
need. 
In short, Islamists consider themselves to be best placed to speak about, defend and promote 
human rights, but often speak of the danger of introducing certain values. They consider these 
values to be Trojan Horses which will destroy traditional conservative society. It is true that 
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with time their position changes, but one must be aware of their selective conception of human 
rights, a conception which is shared by others. 
The Muslim Brotherhood 
Founded in the 1920s, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) soon became active in the cultural and 
social spheres. However, it did not participate in the political fight against French proxy rule. 
After independence in 1946, its role was a discrete one, despite the democratic nature of the 
government. From the 1950s the MB began to work within the framework of the constitution, 
supporting free elections and the democratic transfer of power.  
Although the Muslim Brotherhood was repressed under the United Arab Republic with Egypt 
(1958-61), there were no major clashes with the state. Tensions rose however following the 
coup d’état of 1963, during which the Baath party took power. In 1964 clashes took place 
around the Sultan mosque in Hama, and were followed by dozens of arrests. In 1967 the MB 
organised demonstrations, following the publication of an article in an army journal that it 
considered to be blasphemous. At the beginning of 1973, the Brothers  also showed their 
discontent with the newly-published constitution which made no reference to Islam; following 
this wave of unrest, a reference was duly introduced.  
It was only at the beginning of 1979 that events turned violent, with the assassination of 
intellectuals and figures of authority, especially those belonging to the Alawite community. The 
ensuing repression was brutal with widespread imprisonment and hundreds of killings. It was 
then that the effort to eradicate the MB began. An armed conflict was to last for three years, 
leading hundreds of members into self-imposed exile. While the law of 1980 making 
membership of the Muslim Brotherhood a crime subject to capital punishment has not been 
repealed, in 1993 and again in 2001 there were amnesties for prisoners sympathising with the 
Muslim Brotherhood, such that today there are few political prisoners in this category.  
Within Syria itself the Muslim Brotherhood has ceased to exist as an organisation. However it 
exists in exile, led from London by Ali Sadr al-Din Bayanoumi. In May 2001, the Muslim 
Brotherhood in exile announced their “national charter for political action,” in which they 
rejected violence and called for the upholding of human rights. They saluted the modern state 
with its institutions, rule of law and separation of powers. They made reference to pluralism - 
political, ethnic and religious. According to the same document civil society was to play an 
important role in upholding democracy. The Muslim Brotherhood signed the Déclaration de 
Damas pour le changement démocratique and formed, with the former Vice-President 
Abdulhalim Khaddam,
4 the Front de l’Action National.  
The ‘independent’
5 deputy Mohammad Habach,
6 who has Islamic leanings, does not see the 
need to create an Islamic Party. However, “if the day comes when Syria is a genuine 
democracy, I do not see what the danger is of having an Islamic State.”
7 Paradoxically the 
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Muslim Brotherhood – the only religious party in Syria
8 and, at that, illegal
9 – declares that it 
asks not for the creation not of religious authority, but only a civil authority which respects both 
plurality and change.  
The Islamists and European democracy 
The Muslim Brotherhood ‘guide’ in Syria recently declared that, ‘we reject foreign intervention, 
but we don’t reject having contacts, whether direct or indirect, with the outside world. Since the 
publication of our programme, we have had lots of contact with European countries (...). What I 
regret is the fact that not all foreign pressure on Damascus is related to human rights: Europe 
even signed a cooperation treaty with Syria despite the fact that its jails are full (...). Arab 
regimes describe us as barbarians, but the majority of Islamic movements are seeking 
modernity. The persistence of some countries in not entering into dialogue with us will serve to 
strengthen the extremists who consider us to be atheists and put us in the same bag  as 
Westerners.”
10 
This is a résumé of the Muslim Brotherhood’s position in relation to opening up towards the 
West in general and Europe in particular. Though not the only example, and not necessarily 
even the best reference, Europe serves as an effective model for the democratic hopes of many 
Syrians. This is for many reasons: the quality of democracy which prevails in most countries of 
the European Union; the obligation placed on candidates to improve their democracy before 
applying for membership; the secularism that accommodates differences of all kinds; the 
freedom of expression enjoyed by European citizens. Europe is seen by Islamists as a reference 
point for democracy,
11 even though “we know that a price will have to be paid [by Europe in 
distancing itself from the regime in power], but it’s a good investment in the medium and long 
term.”
12 The changing of power at the highest levels in Europe is often signalled admiringly by 
Islamists when talking of the European experience.  
On the other hand, this does not stop Islamists from criticising what they consider to be 
Europe’s moral laxity (homosexuality, sexual liberty...). Moreover, Europe’s engagement with 
democratic reform in the Arab world is questioned. A large section of the public
13 limits the role 
of Europe in the region to the simple one of backing authoritarian regimes. The same public 
perceives that Europe’s main aim is to force the regimes to become more politically and 
economically dependent on the West. This fear strips references to European democracy of all 
popularity, and leads to rejection. It also creates within the public, especially those with Islamic 
leanings, a negative view of their fellow citizens who do hold such ideas. Thus is it possible for 
these to be considered as ‘traitors’.
14 
As a result, maintaining relations with European non-governmental organisations is more 
attractive to the Islamists. They find that Europe, in spite of its colonial past, has been able to 
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develop non-governmental action which is genuinely independent from state interference. On 
the other hand they reject any collaboration with the United States, be it with the government or 
with NGOs. The reason for this is, according to them, “its colonial present and its blind support 
for the Israeli occupation.”
15 Exchanges with Europe are encouraged and the Islamists “must 
make the most of this privilege by making real friends and allies by accepting their visions of 
democracy.”
16 
A distinction is made, therefore, between the behaviour of European governments on the one 
hand, and that of the NGOs and European research centres on the other. With regards to the 
question of democracy, one contact speaks of a German politician who underlined the extremely 
democratic nature of Hamas’ election in Palestine in January 2005. Yet his country, i.e. 
Germany, refuses to recognise this democratically elected government. An observation often 
repeated in conversations with Islamic-leaning intellectuals and with politicians and political 
activists is that, “European governments do not respect the will of the Palestine people, contrary 
to what they pretend.” 
Unfortunately, a growing number of Syrians, amongst them some Islamists, consider Europe’s 
image to have changed as a result of some of its actions. Examples include its perceived refusal 
to let in Turkey essentially, it is judged, because it is not Christian; its refusal to recognise and 
support an Islamic government in Palestine despite it having been democratically elected; and 
its lack of commitment to defending democratic values in Syria. This has led a leading left-wing 
intellectual and democrat to claim that, “it is not only authoritarian regimes who point to the 
Muslim threat so as to protect their own power, but also the Western powers who look to avoid 
exerting too much effective pressure so as not to impose or inspire democracy. To their minds, 
the big danger is that of leaving the stage free for radical Islamic politics.” 
Notwithstanding this, views on European democracy compare favourably with those on 
American democracy. With American intervention in the region in its current state, few 
intellectuals have the courage to welcome the principles upon which the US has built itself. At 
this level, any comparison inevitably turns in favour of Europe. However, Europe too is seen to 
have its failings and its blind conformity in following the US on issues as sensitive as the fight 
against terrorism, for example, or the right to resistance, draws considerable criticism.  
Conservative Islamists think in terms of a stereotype which links Western democracy to the loss 
of moral values. For the extremists, such democracy has but one objective: “the dismantling of 
the societies and people who adopt it”. It is not, then, a system involving pluralism, alternating 
governments and the separation of powers. This impression has been spread within extremist 
circles and to change it would require huge efforts. The authoritarian regime propagates this 
false idea either directly or indirectly, so as to strengthen itself against demands for democratic 
reform. 
Muslim minorities in Europe 
Syrian Islamists have no single interpretation of the situation of Muslim minorities in Europe. 
The most open, enlightened and moderate go so far as to believe that Europe offers a free and 
hopeful environment for the development of Islam. At the other end of the scale, radicals 
believe that as long as Muslims are not granted the right, by the countries in which they live, to 
practice their religion exactly as they wish to then they are “persecuted”. Between these two 
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poles, all sorts of intermediary positions exist. While for a number of Muslims the issue of 
Muslim minorities in Europe is of legitimate concern, it cannot be isolated from their individual 
position with regards to democracy. In general, the more democratic are more understanding, 
though they might not be entirely approving, of certain measures imposed in Europe; the less 
democratic are more critical. Syrian authorities exploit the imperfect situation of the minorities 
in Europe, using this as a pretext to reject democracy at home.  
Views depend mainly on the scientific, cultural and social awareness of the individual Islamist 
figure being interviewed. It should be noted that a large part of the elite with Islamic leanings 
was educated in Europe, especially in Germany, France and the UK. This elite is steeped in 
Western values, without necessarily having adopted them, but knowing how to exploit them for 
their own purposes. For that reason, the way in which the Muslim situation in Europe is 
assessed varies. Any judgement is often based on concrete issues, such as the banning of the 
Muslim veil in schools or discrimination in the labour market. 
Similarly, the question of the integration of Muslims into European society, especially after 11 
September 2001, has become an important issue for a minority of the Islamic elite. There is a 
body of analytical writing which examines reactions to this integration, and assesses its impact 
on European Muslims. These studies denounce both the generalised incrimination of a whole 
community and the way in which different concepts are confused: Islam, Islamism, Islamist, 
fundamentalist, integrationist and terrorist. 
For some, Muslims in Europe are citizens like any other. They enjoy the same rights as 
everyone else and should be content, given that their country of origin would not grant them 
these. For others, Muslims in Europe are second or even third class citizens. They compare the 
treatment of Muslims with that of the Jewish community and find a large divide between the 
two: “Our beliefs are not respected as much as Jewish ones” is a common refrain. However, 
only extremists make violent calls for “revenge.” These views may not be immediately evident, 
but become recognisable as soon as the tone of the conversation becomes heated: “in any case, 
the number of believers in their house is rising and sooner or later we will have our revenge and 
the position in society we deserve”. 
Europe’s Foreign Policy 
In general terms, the Islamists interpret European foreign policy in the Mediterranean in the 
same way as other Syrians. Some, reacting as Arab nationalists would, denounce any 
intervention as neo-colonialist or with the term ‘crusade’. But more generally they have 
difficulty understanding Europe’s interest in the region. One interlocutor explains this as 
characteristic of Islamist thought, which distances its followers from international politics. They 
pay greater attention to domestic politics and its compatibility with the ways of Islam. When 
they speak of European policy in the Mediterranean, they point first and foremost to the case of 
the Palestinian elections.  
With regards to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership two currents of thought exist. The first, 
which is the more dominant, rejects the partnership outright if it does not go hand in hand with 
political change in Syria at the highest level. This view holds that the Barcelona Process simply 
supports and even profits from corruption within the Syrian regime. As such, any partnership 
formed in the current climate will aggravate still more this deplorable institutional situation. The 
partnership must, in Islamists’ opinion, impose conditions demanding a fundamental reform of 
the mechanisms of power, a state of law and of good governance. “That has to be the basis of 
any partnership if it is to be a stable relationship supported by the population.” 
A second view, prevailing especially among those with weaker education and less access to 
information, sees all rapprochement with the West as being part of a neo-colonialist strategy, 8 | SALAM KAWAKIBI 
 
seeking to “rob the country of its experts, of its riches and to stop the growth of Islam in the 
region”. Paradoxically, this extreme view is shared by certain members of the Baath party who 
are in power.  
For Syrian public opinion in general, including the Islamists, European policy in the 
Mediterranean basin represents a counter-weight capable of balancing unfair and biased 
American policy in the Israeli-Arab conflict. However, the partnership is for most Syrians, and 
especially for the Islamists, a peripheral subject, while the image of Europe’s colonial heritage 
is still important for some. There is also a distinction between the positions adopted by different 
European countries – those of France and the UK for example. Islamists interviewed for this 
chapter evoked common traits such as the hesitation, instability and apprehension of European 
foreign policy in the Middle East. They remarked on the danger of such shortcomings and of 
their possible repercussions within Europe. “Social unrest will affect Europe if we do not 
resolve the economic, social and political problems in our own region,” concludes a moderate 
Islamist. He attributes the region’s problems to the “despotic and corrupt” regimes supported by 
Western policy, and to the West’s “blind” support for Israel, which in turn causes unrest in the 
Muslim communities across Europe. Some see Europe as the “source of all our ills”, having 
been responsible for the creation of the state of Israel. 
A problem often raised is that Europe deals only with those in power, not with the people. 
Europeans “believe that these regimes are immortal and that they have to deal with them. They 
avoid change in the region for fear of the unknown.” Europe must “change its policies and again 
try what it managed to do well in Eastern Europe. Their Arab neighbours cannot continue to be 
poor and repressed, while receiving aid which does nothing to change their sad reality.” 
For Islamists residing in Syria, “the Europeans should and must use the means at their disposal 
to put pressure on regimes by first unifying their policies in the region and by then supporting 
opposition movements and not just Islamist ones.” European participation in reconstructing the 
region’s civil society is much sought after by activist of all kinds. Amongst these the Islamists 
are particularly enthusiastic.  
For certain extremists, or those known in Syrian local jargon as ‘obscurantists’, all that comes 
from the West is nothing but a manifestation of the ‘devil’ and must be cursed. Europe upholds 
atheist regimes with the aim of destroying the “Muslim nation’s moral references”. Such views 
are not widely held, at least openly. Facing down demands for democracy which refer to the 
universal concept of human rights, the political authorities often promote this same worldview. 
In this way authoritarian regimes stress that all that the West seeks to export, in the field of law 
as well as others, is in reality nothing more that a neo-colonialist effort seeking to destroy Arab 
countries' culture and spread discord between the components within those societies. Thus, one 
witnesses an alignment between the ‘obscurantists’ and the political authorities when it comes 
to debate about reforming society and the political system. 
Interestingly, a cooperative attitude can be detected, especially amongst those of the movement 
who live in exile. Years spent in the West have been an enriching process, giving their views a 
democratic dimension. Interviewees consulted for this chapter emphasise the importance of 
Syria having close economic relations with Europe after power has eventually changed hands. 
This does not mean that “our movement will necessarily be in power, but that at least we will be 
recognised as an independent political entity on Syria’s political scene.” The Islamists would 
adopt more or less the same system of economic liberalism, in the Western sense of the term, as 
Turkey. As a result, any rapprochement with Europe, at least on an economic level, would be 
warmly welcomed by them. As their ideological conception of the economy is close to 
capitalism, they would be able to deal with European investors and companies without 
hindrance. As it is, they believe that “we would be better placed to establish transparent and POLITICAL ISLAM IN SYRIA | 9 
 
legal economic relations than those corrupt regimes who close the borders in order to create a 
parallel economy of which they are the principal beneficiaries”. 
Conclusions 
Studying Islamic movements in the Arab countries seems, for both local and foreign 
researchers, to be richly rewarding.  But in some countries this area of research is still a 
minefield. Syria is one of them. For example, in considering the inspiration, motivation and 
policies of political Islam, one can hardly make comparisons between such countries as 
Morocco and Syria. 
Syrian society exhibits a simple indifference towards the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership or the 
European Neighbourhood Policy,. This is explained by the difficulties of everyday life, the 
economic crisis, day-to-day needs and the strict control exercised over political life. But in 
addition it is important to emphasise the informational gap due to the lack of any form of 
communication policy, either by the European institutions or their representatives in Syria. As 
regards the Partnership, the local press, which expresses the official view, often mentions it; the 
Neighbourhood policy is completely absent from public debate. When questioning even senior 
members of Syria’s politically engaged class, this author had to explain in very basic terms what 
the European Neighbourhood Policy actually consisted of.  
For Islamist intellectuals, Europe is relevant only through its policies in Palestine and Iraq, and 
its treatment of its Muslim minorities in Europe. The Partnership becomes a significant subject 
only when dealing with the economic liberalisation that it promotes, or the human rights issues 
raised. There is a lot of enthusiasm with regards to the economic side, but a lot of doubt, to say 
the very least, when it comes to the question of whether the EU is really serious about the 
promotion of democracy.  About CEPS
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research	programmes	and	through	collaborative	
research	networks	involving	the	active	participation	of	
other	highly	reputable	institutes	and	specialists.
Research	Programmes
Economic	&	Social	Welfare	Policies
Energy,	Climate	Change	&	Sustainable	Development
EU	Neighbourhood,	Foreign	&	Security	Policy
Financial	Markets	&	Taxation
Justice	&	Home	Affairs
Politics	&	European	Institutions
Regulatory	Affairs
Trade,	Development	&	Agricultural	Policy
Research	Networks/Joint	Initiatives
Changing	Landscape	of	Security	&	Liberty	(CHALLENGE)
European	Capital	Markets	Institute	(ECMI)
European	Climate	Platform	(ECP)
European	Credit	Research	Institute	(ECRI)
European	Network	of	Agricultural	&	Rural	Policy	Research	
Institutes	(ENARPRI)
European	Network	for	Better	Regulation	(ENBR)
European	Network	of	Economic	Policy	Research	Institutes	
(ENEPRI)
European	Policy	Institutes	Network	(EPIN)
European	Security	Forum	(ESF)
CEPS	also	organises	a	variety	of	activities	and	special	
events,	involving	its	members	and	other	stakeholders	
in	the	European	policy	debate,	national	and	EU-level	
policy-makers,	academics,	corporate	executives,	NGOs	
and	the	media.	CEPS’	funding	is	obtained	from	a	
variety	of	sources,	including	membership	fees,	project	
research,	foundation	grants,	conferences	fees,	publi-
cation	sales	and	an	annual	grant	from	the	European	
Commission.